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RECOGNIZING DISCRIMINATION: LESSONS FROM  
WHITE PLAINTIFFS 
Wendy Parker∗ 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court has developed a robust equal protection 
jurisprudence to recognize the rights of whites complaining of race 
conscious governmental activity. This was particularly reflected in the 
Court’s opinion in Parents Involved, where the Roberts Court radically 
repositioned the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education. That opinion all 
but guarantees that eventually Abigail Noel Fisher will win her case 
against the University of Texas. In the meantime, however, the case also 
holds promise for minority plaintiffs. While many have lamented Parents 
Involved and its use of Brown, we have missed the promise of the Roberts 
Court’s “process-only discrimination” for minority plaintiffs. This Article 
argues that the Roberts Court adopted a version of color-blind 
jurisprudence so unconditional and absolute that it unintentionally, but 
unmistakably, offers great promise to nonwhite plaintiffs. By making 
unlawful any different treatment of an individual by race, regardless of 
whether it has substantive consequences, the Roberts Court expanded what 
is actionable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not just for white plaintiffs but also for minority plaintiffs. 
This Article unpacks that promise, and attempts to hold Chief Justice John 
Roberts accountable for all the consequences of his absolute commitment 
to color-blind jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When will the law deem someone a victim of race discrimination? 
Traditionally, the answer was different treatment that caused substantive 
harm.1 This Article calls this “substantive discrimination.” For example, 
the Supreme Court doomed the state statutes challenged in Brown v. Board 
of Education (Brown I) not only because they assigned the plaintiffs to 
schools because of their “Negro” race (a process harm), but also because 
that race-based assignment produced other harms (substantive ones).2 The 
Warren Court contextualized the process harm in its substantive effects: 
the “feeling of inferiority” created by de jure segregation, the inequality 
inherent in separate education, and the importance of education, which is 
“perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.”3 
The assignment based on race did not create the constitutional violation by 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at 493–95. 
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itself; the Warren Court linked that procedure with substantive harms.4  
The adoption of substantive discrimination was not unique to the liberal 
Warren Court. Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
connected the harm of racially separate railroad cars with the creation of a 
caste system.5 The Rehnquist Court continued that tradition,6 even as it 
shifted the Court to a more color-blind interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.7 It adopted color-blind principles for their association 
with positive individual and social values.8 
The Roberts Court has changed, however, the meaning of 
discrimination in a series of cases with white plaintiffs claiming race 
discrimination. Parents Involved, a K-12 student assignment case, marked 
the start of this shift.9 The 2013 opinion in Fisher, an affirmative action in 
university admissions case, continued that evolution.10 In these cases and 
others, the Roberts Court continued to endorse the color blindness 
supported by the Rehnquist Court, but with one important variation. It is 
now possible for illegal discrimination to arise solely from the process of 
different treatment, without proof of any attending substantive harm. For 
example, the Roberts Court defined the harm to the white plaintiffs in 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Id.  
 5. 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (“[W]e have yet, in some of the States, a dominant race—a 
superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all 
citizens, upon the basis of race.”); id. (recognizing that state laws that “proceed on the ground that 
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches 
occupied by white citizens” perpetuate racial distrust and animosity and “[t]hat . . . is the real 
meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana”); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-
Reading Justice Harlan’s Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 969 (“[W]hat was offensive about the statute was not its use of race per 
se, but that its motivation and effect were to establish and maintain a race-based caste system in 
which whites subjugated blacks.”). 
 6. See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
 7. This Article refers to “color-blind” as the belief that laws should be written and enforced 
as if all races are the same, regardless of any existing or resulting substantive differences; no racial 
classifications are permitted in the quest for formal equality. See Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation Of 
Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992–1004 
(2007) (detailing the history of the jurisprudence); infra Subsection I.B.1. See generally Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (tracing the 
Rehnquist Court’s adoption of color-blind jurisprudence). 
 8. See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
 9. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–11 
(2007) (holding that school districts impermissibly considered race in school assignments); see also 
Section I.A. 
 10. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013); infra Subsection I.C.1. In a 
decision invalidating part of the Voting Rights Act delivered the day after Fisher, Chief Justice 
Roberts again exhibited a quest to eradicate race conscious decision making—this time in the 
context of the U.S. Congress regulating voting rights. See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612, 2631 (2013). There, Chief Justice Roberts faulted Congress for its continued reliance on an 
expansive coverage formula for parts of the Voting Rights Act, in part, because “things have 
changed dramatically.” Id. at 2625.  
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Parents Involved as only different treatment during the process of deciding 
school assignment.11 In turn, this allowed Abigail Noel Fisher to sue the 
University of Texas for race discrimination, even if she would not have 
been admitted if a minority applicant.12 This Article defines this as 
“process discrimination.” 
I once joined with those lamenting the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Parents Involved.13 Now, however, a silver lining to the dark cloud of 
Parents Involved can be found. If any racial attentiveness in a challenged 
process alone violates the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the lack 
of independent harm from that unequal procedure, traditional-
discrimination plaintiffs benefit. Adopting a vigorous definition of color-
blind can work to the advantage of plaintiffs of all races, and not just Ms. 
Fisher. This Article seeks to reveal that mutual advantage.  
Consider a manager, working for a state, who fired a Latino worker 
with one single utterance negative to his Latino heritage.14 Any attending 
lawsuit would traditionally ask whether the worker was fired because of 
ethnicity. That single utterance would do little in demonstrating why the 
worker was fired. Instead, the issue would be whether the Latino worker 
deserved to be fired, or whether the plaintiff’s ethnicity caused the firing.  
Parents Involved shifted the focus away from the firing issue to a 
process question: Did the manager treat the Latino worker differently than 
a non-Latino worker during the firing process? Would the manager have 
made the statement to a white worker? If not, then the manager was 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See infra Subsection I.A.3. 
 12. See infra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style, 63 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 507, 509–10 (2009) (arguing that Parents Involved signals “a meaning of Brown advocated by 
early resisters to the change imposed by Brown”); see also Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of 
Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 937, 941 (2008) (lamenting that “Parents Involved stifles Grutter’s potential”); James 
E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 151 (2007) (“By 
jettisoning principles and methods of interpretation used in other cases, the Court appears to be 
reaching out to curtail a practice—integration—that it simply dislikes as a policy matter.”); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 592–607 (2008) (arguing that 
Parents Involved overruled Brown and sacrificed the interests of integration and racial minorities 
for the benefit of limited white interests); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School 
Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REV. 158, 162 (2007) (agreeing with the color-blind 
principle of Parents Involved, but suggesting that the Court’s opinion should have included “an 
acknowledgment of the tragic elements of the African American experience in this country and how 
that history can be reconciled with the Court’s present-day equal protection argument”). 
 14. For examples of cases in which terminated employees sued their public employers for 
race discrimination based on allegedly racist remarks, see Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 925, 
930 (9th Cir. 2007); Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2004); Tullo v. 
City of Mount Vernon, 237 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Aguilera v. Village of Hazel 
Crest, 234 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843–44 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Stephens v. City of Topeka, 33 F. Supp. 2d 
947, 953–54 (D. Kan. 1999), aff’d, 189 F.3d 478 (10th Cir. 1999); Farasat v. Paulikas, 32 F. Supp. 
2d 249, 251–52 (D. Md. 1998), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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discriminatory under the reasoning of Parents Involved. Likewise, the 
question in Fisher is now whether Ms. Fisher was treated differently 
during the admissions process—not whether she would have been admitted 
if she were African-American or Latino.15  
The Roberts Court was able to make this change to how it 
conceptualizes discrimination, in part, because Parents Involved is neither 
a school desegregation case nor an affirmative action case. It occupies a 
new space in our so-called post-racial society.16  
The difficulty with the hypothetical Latino employee is causation and 
damages. What exactly are the damages caused by the ethnically hostile 
statement? This Article explores how the process discrimination 
recognized in Parents Involved affects these questions of causation and 
injury in traditional discrimination cases. This Article argues that the 
Court’s adoption of process discrimination in reverse discrimination cases 
expands the definition of discriminatory injury, and that minority plaintiffs 
should use that definition—if the remedy is carefully crafted. 
This argument proceeds in three parts. Part I reveals how the Supreme 
Court created process-only discrimination in Parents Involved. This Article 
argues that the Supreme Court devised an unconditional version of color-
blind jurisprudence to expand constitutional injury to include any different 
treatment, including process-only claims. Part I ends with exploring how 
this enables white plaintiffs to win their reverse discrimination cases. 
Specifically, this Article predicts that Ms. Fisher will one day win her case 
against the University of Texas, even if she would not have been admitted 
if she were African-American or Latino.17  
Part II turns to the effect of the expanded definition of constitutional 
injury on claims by minority plaintiffs. It focuses on the difficulty of 
proving discriminatory intent, which is a key component of any 
discrimination claim. The expanded definition of injury will make some 
aspects of discriminatory intent easier to prove for minority plaintiffs. Yet, 
even after Parents Involved, nonwhite plaintiffs will still struggle to 
demonstrate discriminatory intent.  
Part III argues that the process discrimination found in Parents Involved 
is at odds with at least three principles concerning what counts as a 
discrimination injury—the racial harassment definition, stray remarks 
doctrine, and same decision defense. All three principles permit certain 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See infra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (defining “post-
racialism” as “a twenty-first-century ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial 
progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-
based remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social 
action”); infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 230 (5th Cir. 2011), aff’g 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 
597 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416–17 (2013); infra Subsection 
I.C.1.  
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instances of explicitly racial conduct and are inconsistent with Parents 
Involved’s command of absolute color blindness. Lastly, this Part 
recognizes that process-only injuries will likely result in more limited, but 
still valuable, remedies.  
I.  PARENTS INVOLVED’S DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION 
This Part describes how Parents Involved reveals the Roberts Court’s 
adoption of process-only discrimination.18 That approach differs from how 
the Rehnquist Court defined discrimination,19 and greatly eases the way for 
white plaintiffs to contest race-conscious governmental activity.20 Lastly, 
this Article explains why Ms. Fisher should win her claim of race 
discrimination against the University of Texas and how the 2013 opinion 
in Fisher helps actualize Parents Involved’s concept of discrimination.  
A.  Parents Involved and Process Discrimination 
Parents Involved addressed the constitutionality of student assignment 
policies at two school districts—one in Louisville, Kentucky and the other 
in Seattle, Washington.21 The litigation followed Grutter v. Bollinger, 
where the Supreme Court allowed race conscious student admissions to 
achieve student diversity in the higher education setting.22  
1.  The Plans and Their Unconstitutionality 
The two school districts voluntarily turned to a popular educational 
reform effort, parental choice, to redress an almost timeless situation—
segregated schools.23 The problem, declared the Supreme Court, was that 
the school districts controlled parental choice by a variety of factors, one of 
which was race.24  
Public schools in Jefferson County (Louisville), Kentucky required that 
parental applications for enrollment be processed so that all non-magnet 
schools would be between fifteen and fifty percent black in student 
population.25 Seattle, Washington schools mandated that applications for 
ninth grade be granted so that student enrollment in all high schools would 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Fisher and Ricci are certainly instructive as well, but this Article focuses on Parents 
Involved because of its significance. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. This Article 
discusses how my interpretation of Parents Involved is consistent with Fisher and Ricci. See infra 
Subsections I.C.1–2.  
 19. See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
 20. See infra Section I.D. 
 21. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710 (2007). 
 22. 539 U.S. 306, 328, 343 (2003). For an in-depth examination of the story behind the case, 
see Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in EDUCATION LAW 
STORIES 83, 97 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008). 
 23. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 710–11, 716. 
 24. Id. at 710–11. 
 25. Id. at 716. 
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be within ten or fifteen percentage points of the school district’s white and 
nonwhite high school population.26  
A five-Justice majority held the plans unconstitutional in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Roberts.27 Justice Anthony Kennedy did not join two parts of 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, thereby making those portions a plurality 
opinion.28 Justice Kennedy also wrote his own concurring opinion.29  
Critically, race was a factor in the plans, but not the only factor. Chief 
Justice Roberts overstated his case when he, in the opening paragraph of 
his majority opinion, wrote that student assignment for the plaintiffs was 
“solely because of their race.”30 The word “solely” would be fair in the 
context of the de jure segregation challenged in Brown, but not in twenty-
first century Louisville and Seattle. 
No student in Parents Involved was assigned solely because of race. 
Assignment was based on a variety of factors. Parental choice was given 
the most weight.31 Race was a deciding factor for a small percentage of 
students,32 but only after parental choice, sibling placement, and home 
address narrowed the options for the student.33 Race was certainly part of 
the process, and a few times a tiebreaker, but race alone did not determine 
assignment like it did in de jure segregation. 
The Court criticized both school districts’ rough racial classifications.34 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 712. 
 27. Id. at 707. 
 28. Id.  
 29. See id. at 782. Justices Thomas, Stevens, and Breyer also wrote separately. See id. at 748, 
798, 803. 
 30. Id. at 711. 
 31. Id. at 711, 716.  
 32. Specifically in Seattle, 307 students “were affected by the racial tiebreaker.” Id. at 733. 
Yet, the Supreme Court concluded that “only 52 students . . . were ultimately affected adversely by 
the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference 
and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned.” Id. at 734. The Court noted that in 
Jefferson County, “the racial guidelines account[ed] for only 3 percent of assignments.” Id. 
Interestingly, the small number of students affected indicated the lack of necessity for the plans. Id. 
at 728. Justice Kennedy emphasized this as well in his concurring opinion. Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he small number of assignments affected 
suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through different means.”).  
 33. Seattle’s plan included a preference for siblings, for geographic proximity between a 
student’s home and school, and for geographic proximity to child care. Id. at 711–12 (majority 
opinion); id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. 
Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“Prior to any consideration of a student’s race, a myriad of 
other factors, such as place of residence, school capacity, program popularity, random draw and the 
nature of the student’s choices, will have a more significant effect on school assignment.”), aff’d 
per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. 701. 
 34. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723–24 (“[T]he plans here employ only a limited notion of 
diversity . . . .”). The district court in the Louisville case largely accepted the classifications because 
the school district only had significant numbers of African-American and white students. 
7
Parker:  Recognizing Discrimination: Lessons from White Plaintiffs
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1878 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Louisville classified students as either black or nonblack, and Seattle 
designated students as white or nonwhite.35 Perhaps the most damning fact 
was Seattle’s policy that a high school with a half white and half Asian-
American student population would meet its racial classifications, but not a 
school with roughly a quarter each of African-American, Asian-American, 
Latino, and white students.36  
In this respect, the school districts made it easy to criticize their 
programs for the lack of nuance present in the University of Michigan Law 
School program upheld in Grutter. Both school districts used race in a less 
sophisticated manner than a law school program devised by law professors 
who anticipated litigation.37 In Louisville and Seattle, however, the lower 
courts upheld the constitutionality of the plans under Grutter.38  
2.  Grutter and Gratz 
Grutter and Gratz provide the starting point for evaluating the 
constitutionality of the school districts’ student assignment plans in 
                                                                                                                     
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 840 n.6. 
 35. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723. The University of Michigan Law School, on the other 
hand, recognized at least seven categories: Native American, Black/African-American, 
Caucasian/White, Mexican-American, Other Hispanic, Asian-American, and Puerto Rican 
American. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The University of 
Michigan Law School particularly focused on three racial groups typically underrepresented in its 
student body: African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 316 (2003). 
 36. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724; see also id. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (finding that the Seattle School District “has failed to explain why, in a 
district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students classified as ‘white,’ it 
has employed the crude racial categories of ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ as the basis for its assignment 
decisions”). Overall, Seattle had 23.8% Asian-American, 23.1% African-American, and 10.3% 
Latino student populations. Id. at 712 n.2 (majority opinion). However, Justice Breyer noted in his 
dissent that Seattle was discontinuing this approach. Id. at 854 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court of 
Appeals found justification for the approach in Seattle’s segregated housing patterns. Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved VII), 426 F.3d 1162, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) (“The white/nonwhite distinction is narrowly tailored to prioritize movement of 
students from the north of the city to the south of [the] city and vice versa.”), rev’d and remanded, 
551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 37. For example, the law school was careful not to attach any numbers to its plan, see Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 316; was attentive to devising a broad definition of diversity that all racial groups could 
utilize, see id. at 337–38; and was able to argue that it never used race as a decisive factor, see id. at 
337.  
 38. McFarland, 416 F.3d at 514 (per curium), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. 701; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved I), 
137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (granting the school district summary judgment), 
aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166, rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861 
(holding in favor of the school district in all respects but one); see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch. 
Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding a race-conscious transfer program challenged 
by white plaintiffs). 
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Parents Involved.39 The Supreme Court in Gratz declared that the 
University of Michigan undergraduate admissions system of awarding an 
additional twenty points to underrepresented minority applicants was 
unconstitutional.40 That automatic, numerical approach was not narrowly 
tailored to the compelling governmental interest of diversity.41  
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with the outcome in Gratz,42 but 
then switched sides to give the deciding fifth vote to uphold the University 
of Michigan Law School’s more nuanced, flexible admissions system in 
Grutter.43 She emphasized the individual review in the law school’s 
practices and the absence of any fixed numerical goals in the law school’s 
quest for a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students.44 Schools 
wishing to consider race in student admissions or assignment thus must 
create a system free of the fault of Gratz and consistent with the individual 
review in Grutter. 
Yet, navigating the differences between Grutter and Gratz is difficult. 
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in part from Grutter because of the 
ambiguity created by what he called the “split double header” of Grutter 
and Gratz.45 Even more troubling, the dissenting Justices in Grutter found 
no meaningful difference between the law school’s plan and the 
undergraduate’s approach.46 In practice, the dissenting Justices declared, 
Grutter was like Gratz.47 The line separating the two Michigan cases is, at 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); see also Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013) (using Grutter and Gratz as starting points for evaluating the 
constitutionality of considering race in university admissions).  
 40. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, 275. 
 41. Id. at 271–75. 
 42. Id. at 276–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 43. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340, 343 (O’Connor, J., writing for the majority). 
 44. Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a 
diverse educational environment.”). 
 45. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  A split double header 
occurs in baseball, when teams play each other in back to back games and each team wins one 
game. 
 46. The dissenting Justices argued that this lack of a meaningful difference was mainly 
indicated by the pattern of admitting about the same number of African-American, Hispanic, and 
Native American students each year and by defining the quest for critical mass differently for each 
minority group. Id. at 346–48 (agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist that “[t]he admissions 
statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions”); id. at 385–
86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School’s 
admissions program that the Court finds appealing appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed 
program designed to ensure proportionate representation of applications from selected minority 
groups.”) (citation omitted); id. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and adding that “[t]he consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the 
admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for race itself”). 
 47. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas also argued that the law school’s quest for diversity 
operated as a “quota.” See id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by 
9
Parker:  Recognizing Discrimination: Lessons from White Plaintiffs
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1880 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
best, murky.48  
What is clear, however, is that Gratz prohibits awarding specific points 
to some races but not others.49 The plans under attack in Parents Involved 
avoided this pitfall. First, all races and ethnicities were subject to and 
affected by the mandated percentages50—all races had applications granted 
and denied because of the school districts’ defined goals. Second, the 
school districts’ mandated percentages in Parents Involved were more like 
Grutter’s critical mass quest than Gratz’s automatic twenty-point 
scoring.51 The school districts in Louisville and Seattle adopted a mandated 
                                                                                                                     
Thomas, J.); id. at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist provided original analysis 
of the numbers to argue the effect of a quota. He noted, for example, that of the minority students 
admitted between 1995 and 2000, “between 13 and 19 were Native American, between 91 and 108 
were African-American, and between 47 and 56 were Hispanic.” Id. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, “[T]he correlation between the percentage 
of the Law School’s pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the 
percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be 
dismissed as merely the result of the school paying ‘some attention to [the] numbers.’” Id. at 383 
(alterations in original). He explains, “For example, in 1995, when 9.7% of the applicant pool was 
African-American, 9.4% of the admitted class was African-American. By 2000, only 7.5% of the 
applicant pool was African-American, and 7.3% of the admitted class was African-American.” Id. at 
385. 
 48.  Similarly, the plans in Parents Involved did not set aside a specific number of admission 
seats by race, which is prohibited by Bakke. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (“Properly understood, a ‘quota’ is 
a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively 
for certain minority groups.’”) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 
(1989) (plurality opinion)); Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 1185 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(“[T]he number of white and nonwhite students in the high schools is flexible and varies from 
school to school and from year to year.”), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); McFarland v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“[T]he guidelines provide 
administrators with the authority to facilitate, negotiate and collaborate with principals and staff to 
maintain schools within the 15–50% range.”), aff’d per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d 
and remanded sub nom. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 49. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271, 275 (2003). 
 50. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d at 1192 (“[I]t is undisputed that the race-based tiebreaker 
does not uniformly benefit one race or group to the detriment of another. At some schools, white 
students are given preference over nonwhite students, and, at other schools, nonwhite students are 
given preference over white students.”); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (“[T]he 2001 Plan uses 
race in a manner calculated not to harm any particular person because of his or her race. Certainly, 
no student is directly denied a benefit because of race so that another of a different race can receive 
that benefit. Rather, the Board uses race in a limited way to achieve benefits for all students through 
its integrated schools.”); Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“The 
program at issue here falls indiscriminately on whites and nonwhites alike, ensuring a racially 
integrated system for the benefit of the school district as a whole. Even while the program allows 
minority students access to Ballard and Hale, Seattle’s popular predominantly white schools, it also 
allows white students access to Franklin, the city’s popular predominantly minority school. It is in 
this sense, too, that the program is not a ‘preference.’” (emphasis omitted)), aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 
(9th Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 51. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (“[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept 
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percentage, but it was flexible—Louisville had a thirty-five percent band 
and Seattle had a twenty to thirty percent band.52 The numerical bands in 
Parents Involved thus were more like the law school’s quest for the 
enrollment of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities: an attention to 
numbers, but numbers devoid of any absolute quality.53  
An even more fundamental difference, however, exists. Gratz and 
Grutter involved traditional affirmative action plans, while Parents 
Involved did not. In Gratz and Grutter, identified races received a benefit 
in a merit-based system.54 Contrarily, merit was completely absent from 
the student assignment plans in Parents Involved. Also, no race received a 
preference in the Parents Involved plans—all races were treated equally. 
The mandated percentages affected both whites and nonwhites.55 Clearly, 
Parents Involved is not an affirmative action case. 
Neither is Parents Involved a school desegregation case, despite Chief 
Justice Roberts’s efforts to equate the school districts’ plans with de jure 
segregation.56 School segregation depends on the intent to create separate 
schools and creates a constitutional duty to desegregate.57 The school 
districts in Parents Involved sought to promote racial diversity, not 
segregate. Thus, their use of race did not create a duty to desegregate, 
which is the most elemental part of school desegregation litigation.58  
Parents Involved is a post-school desegregation case that is not 
affirmative action in disguise. It occupies a different space.59 That space 
created room for the Roberts Court to both restrict Grutter (after all, the 
Grutter dissenting Justices are now in the majority) and create a new 
concept of what it means to discriminate, what this Article calls “process 
                                                                                                                     
by reference to the substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce, including cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial 
stereotypes.”), with Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (holding that assigning twenty points to all applicants 
from underrepresented minority groups is unconstitutional). 
 52. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 53. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“‘[S]ome attention to numbers,’ without more, does not 
transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.” (alteration in original)). 
 54. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315–16. 
 55. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra Subsection I.A.4. 
 57. See Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1161–
62, 1165 (2000). 
 58. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 794 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 59. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., 
concurring) (reasoning that a similar plan was “fundamentally different from almost anything that 
the Supreme Court has previously addressed”); Rachel F. Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making 
Grutter Matter in School Desegregation Cases, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 483–84 (2009) 
(contending that the Parents Involved Court “largely ignored the distinction between diversity and 
desegregation”). 
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discrimination.”60  
3.  Process Discrimination 
Defining discrimination solely by the process of considering race began 
in Parents Involved. As explained in this section, the Court focused 
entirely on the need for race-free individual treatment, with no attention to 
any independent substantive harm. Racial attentiveness in the student 
assignment process completed the constitutional injury. 
Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis in Parents Involved by 
mischaracterizing the challenged plans as treating race as the factor driving 
assignment decisions.61 As explained earlier, race is clearly a factor, but it 
is unfair to describe the plans as akin to de jure segregation where race 
truly was the only factor in student assignment.62  
Chief Justice Roberts then faulted the plans for their lack of individual 
review,63 when student assignment plans by definition are never about 
individual review.64 Student assignment plans treat groups of students 
(those in particular attendance zones or those with siblings in the school, 
for example) the same. Yet, the lack of individual review drove all aspects 
of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. 
To hold the policies unconstitutional, Chief Justice Roberts also had to 
reconfigure Grutter. He argued that “[t]he entire gist of . . . Grutter was 
that the admissions program . . . focused on each applicant as an 
individual.”65 The facts of Grutter suggest otherwise.  Barbara Grutter 
almost certainly would have been admitted if she were African-American, 
American Indian, or Hispanic, instead of white.66 This is far from the type 
of individual treatment Chief Justice Roberts is advocating in Parents 
Involved. 
Grutter, like other race opinions of the Rehnquist Court, was about 
more than individual treatment; it emphasized a host of values other than 
treating individuals equally.67 As Professor Michelle Adams recognizes, 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743.  Judge Kozinski would use this space to apply a 
rational basis standard of review. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 61. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711, 723. 
 62. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723. 
 64. That is, the assignment process had no merit component to it, unlike in Grutter. Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 370 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 65. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added). 
 66. The three minority applicants with scores similar to Mrs. Grutter’s were all offered 
admission. Parker, supra note 22, at 92. 
 67.  In Fisher v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit identified “three distinct educational objectives 
served by diversity [that Justice O’Connor] . . . envisioned” in Grutter—namely increased 
perspectives, professionalism, and civic engagement. 631 F.3d 213, 219–20 (5th Cir. 2011), 
vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The Grutter Court also emphasized that 
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the Rehnquist Court engaged in a cost-benefit balancing that preferred the 
societal benefits of the law school’s program over the individual harm to 
Ms. Grutter.68 The Court in Grutter found that the many benefits of the 
diversity policy were worth the costs of the explicit use of race in student 
admissions. The Court did not mention, however, any of those values in its 
Parents Involved opinion. Instead, it falsely reduced Grutter to being just 
about individual treatment. 
The opinion is also notable for what it ignores. First, the process did not 
affect any race differently; all races had applications denied and granted 
after the racial factor was applied.69 Many would count this as equal 
protection under the laws.70 The Roberts Court refused, however, to equate 
that with equal treatment.  
 Second, the majority was perfectly content that the plaintiffs did not 
allege any specific harm from having to attend their assigned school 
instead of their preferred school.71 The Supreme Court in Brown faulted 
the inequality inherent in segregated education, but none of the parties in 
Parents Involved even suggested inequality.72 The presumption was that 
the schools were entirely equal, except that some of the schools were 
sometimes oversubscribed.73  
One parent (and only one) alleged that her son needed a particular 
                                                                                                                     
educational diversity was necessary to meet the needs of American businesses and the American 
military, as reflected in their respective amici briefs. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31. 
 68. See Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 1941, 1949 (2004) (“This form of strict scrutiny allows affirmative action programs to go 
forward that serve general societal interests over individual ones where those interests are served in 
an appropriate manner; neither the rights of individual white applicants nor of individual minority 
group members are paramount from this perspective.”); id. at 1953 (“[T]here is a strong argument 
that the Court was more concerned with how the Law School’s application process actually 
appeared and the message that it sent to the public than with its impact on any particular white 
applicant.”). 
 69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (upholding the closing of a 
public swimming pool to avoid integration because all races were treated alike). 
 71. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Seattle plan produces “no competition between the races, and no race is 
given a preference over another”), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 72. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that the segregation of public school students 
based solely on race deprives minority students of equal educational opportunities, even if the 
physical facilities and other “tangible” factors are equal). 
 73. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d at 1185 (quoting the manager of enrollment as testifying 
that “[e]verything happens when more people want the seats. And why they want the seats 
sometimes we don’t know”); McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 860 
(W.D. Ky. 2004) (“[W]hen the Board makes a student assignment among its equal and integrated 
schools, it neither denies anyone a benefit nor imposes a wrongful burden.”), aff’d per curiam, 416 
F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
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program offered at an oversubscribed school.74 Yet, no federal right to a 
particular educational program exists outside of special education or 
bilingual education; nor do students have the right to attend their nearest 
school.75 In fact, the opposite is true: local school districts have the right to 
require attendance at an assigned school.76 The school districts are not 
obligated to provide any choice at all. Instead, the Court has a long 
tradition of deferring to local educators in the name of “local control.”77 
Third, the plaintiffs actually suffered no harm other than racial 
attentiveness in a multifaceted student assignment process. The Roberts 
Court said nothing of damage to the hearts and minds of affected 
students.78 Nor could it be said that any stigma attached to a non-merit-
based decision. Parental disappointment in their children’s school 
assignment was only personal disappointment; the student assignment 
itself was not a constitutional injury. In short, the only constitutional injury 
was racial considerations in student assignment.  
                                                                                                                     
 74. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 713–14 (2007) 
(involving a special-needs student Andy Meeks who was accepted to a high school’s selective 
biotechnology program, but because of a racial tiebreaker, was denied assignment to the high 
school). 
 75. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 
(1974) (finding a statutory violation for English-language instruction to non-English speaking 
students). In fact, the U.S. Constitution provides a very limited right to any type of education. See 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 230 (1982) (holding that the state of Texas could not deny public 
K-12 education to undocumented children under the Equal Protection Clause); San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 23–24 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental 
right, but leaving open the question of whether deprivation of a minimal level of education might 
violate a fundamental constitutional right); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) 
(“As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet definitively settled the question[] of 
whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right . . . .”). Nor do children have any 
right to attend their nearest school. Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1382–83 (1978).  
 76. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (noting that 
“school boards customarily have the power to create school attendance areas and otherwise 
designate the school that particular students may attend”). 
 77. For an examination of the importance the Supreme Court has historically placed on local 
control in education cases, see Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, 
and Federalism,  45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1705–16 (2004). For example, the Supreme Court 
has allowed school districts leeway in determining their school desegregation remedies so as not to 
impose on local control. Id. at 1728–30 (discussing the importance of local control to the Rehnquist 
Court in its school desegregation opinions). Parents Involved placed no importance, however, on 
local control.  
 78. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d at 1181 (noting the absence of stigma because “no 
assignment to any of the District’s high schools is tethered to a student’s qualifications”); id. at 
1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“That a student is denied the school of his choice may be 
disappointing, but it carries no racial stigma and says nothing at all about that individual’s aptitude 
or ability.”); see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Because 
transfers under the Lynn Plan are not tied to merit, the Plan’s use of race does not risk imposing 
stigmatic harm . . . .”). 
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Consequently a minority group of white parents can trump the 
majority’s will (as reflected in a popularly elected school board) on the 
distribution of public goods—without showing that denying the white 
parents their personal preference even resulted in a harmful distribution of 
public goods on an individual level. As Professor Girardeau A. Spann aptly 
described it, “[D]isappointed white parents, therefore, were sacrificing the 
inclusionary educational interests of minority school children in order to 
advance exclusionary educational interests of their own.”79  
The Roberts Court was willing to take this step because it wanted to 
scrub any and all race consciousness from government decision making. 
The majority evidenced a concern with the continuing consideration of 
race; it sought to eradicate it completely from government decision 
making80—no matter what the cost to society or other constitutional values 
such as local control over schools.81 A plurality of Justices, over the 
objection of Justice Kennedy and the dissenting Justices, went so far as to 
remake the iconic Brown v. Board of Education in this image of racial 
neutrality, as the next subsection explores. 
4.  Brown v. Board of Education 
The Roberts Court in Parents Involved did more than hold the 
challenged plans unconstitutional. A plurality of Justices was bold enough 
to declare that Brown v. Board of Education mandated that outcome.82  
That is, according to the Parents Involved plurality, the Louisville and 
Seattle school districts engaged in the exact same harm as the Brown 
defendants.83 The plurality asked: “What do the racial classifications at 
issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on the basis of race?”84 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Spann, supra note 13, at 603.  
 80. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) 
(“Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would ‘effectively assur[e] that race will 
always be relevant in American life, and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from 
governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race will never be 
achieved.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 81. McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“It 
would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal protection, local control and limited deference are 
now only one-way streets to a particular educational policy, virtually prohibiting the voluntary 
continuation of policies once required by law.”), aff’d per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).  
 82. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746–47 (plurality opinion). Those joining the plurality 
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts were Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 709. For a thorough 
and insightful examination of this issue, see generally Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A 
Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791 (2008). 
 83. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (plurality opinion).  
 84. Id. at 747. Justice Thomas made a similar argument in his concurrence in Fisher v. 
University of Texas. See 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2424–25 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). Relying on 
briefs and arguments in the original Brown cases, he argued that considering race to achieve 
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At the end of its opinion, the plurality then declared, “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”85 In doing so, the Parents Involved plurality reduced Brown to one 
value: no race-based decision making.  
While debates about the “true” meaning of Brown abound,86 few 
outside the 1950s and 1960s South have argued that Brown only required 
racial neutrality—that is, no one until Chief Justice Roberts.87 To say that 
Brown required only racially neutral student assignment ignores the most 
memorable line from Brown that “[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”88 It also ignores the long-standing constitutional duty 
to change racially explicit laws and desegregate schools “root and 
branch.”89 Not surprisingly, many have protested the plurality’s use of 
Brown.90  
The plurality’s treatment of Brown is also quite different from that of its 
predecessor Court. The Rehnquist Court, while recognizing that school 
desegregation remedies must be tempered by practicality, affirmed that 
Brown’s promise was not just to end racial barriers to enrollment, but also 
to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimination.91 The Rehnquist 
                                                                                                                     
diversity for the benefit of minority students mirrors segregationists’ previous arguments that 
segregation was used for the benefit of minority students. See id. at 2428 (“There is no principled 
distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational benefits and the 
segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same benefits.”). 
 85. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. The language comes from Judge Bea’s dissenting 
opinion in the Seattle case. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) (“The way to end racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by 
race.”), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); see also id. at 1191 n.34 (majority opinion) 
(“More properly stated, the way to end segregation is to stop separation of the races. The Seattle 
school district is attempting to do precisely that.”). 
 86. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
 87. See Parker, supra note 77, at 1708–13. 
 88. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 89. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968). 
 90. Justice Stevens, arguing that no member of the Court he “joined in 1975 would have 
agreed with today’s decision,” declared that “[t]here is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance 
on our decision in [Brown].” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798–99, 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Professor Charles Lawrence calls this “the rape of Brown v. Board of Education and the claim that 
she had consented.” Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the 
Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 934 
(2008); see also Ryan, supra note 13, at 152 (“To detach the underlying goal—school integration—
from the arguments made in advance of that goal is to distort history.”); Spann, supra note 13, at 
566, 592 (contending that Parents Involved overruled Brown and is more consistent with the 
majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).  
 91. The Rehnquist Court issued three school desegregation opinions in the 1990s. In all three, 
the Court required more than race-neutral student assignment plans to fulfill the mandate of Brown. 
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995) (“The ultimate inquiry is ‘whether the 
[constitutional violator] ha[s] complied in good faith with the desegregation decree . . . and whether 
the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.’” (alterations in 
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Court, unlike the Roberts Court, treated Brown as requiring more than 
simple racial neutrality in student assignment. Even more fundamentally, 
the Rehnquist Court recognized the need for practical race-conscious 
measures to cure the lingering disparate effects of past discrimination.92 
5.  Justice Kennedy Concurs 
Justice Kennedy joined most of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, but not 
all. He rejected the plurality’s reaction to the school districts’ racial 
justifications: “The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate 
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity 
regardless of their race.”93 He also chastised the plurality for its treatment 
of Brown.94 Instead, Justice Kennedy clearly supported diversity in the 
classroom for both kindergartners and law students.95 He would allow 
“race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way,” such 
as by influencing where new schools are constructed and how student 
attendance zones are configured.96  
 Justice Kennedy did not, however, fault the majority for finding 
discrimination only from the process of racial attentiveness without proof 
of any other harm. He joined Chief Justice Roberts in this regard. Justice 
Kennedy had the utmost concern for individual treatment, even with his 
support for diversity. If the two cannot coexist, Justice Kennedy would 
prefer race-neutral individual treatment over diversity, just as he did in 
Ricci and Grutter.97 The same is also true of his opinion in Fisher, where 
he emphasized the need for rigorous narrow tailoring analysis.98 Justice 
                                                                                                                     
original) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992)); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485 (“[T]he 
principal wrong of the de jure system [is] the injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored 
by the violation.” (emphasis omitted)); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991) 
(holding that district courts must determine “whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable. . . . [by] look[ing] not only at student assignments, but ‘to every 
facet of school operations—faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.’” 
(quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 435)). 
 92. See Parker, supra note 77, at 1728–30. 
 93. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 787–88 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 788. 
 95. Id. at 783 (“Diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
educational goal a school district may pursue.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–88 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that diversity can be a compelling governmental reason in 
the higher education setting). 
 96. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788–89 (emphasis added). Given the ineffectiveness of 
race-neutral measures aimed at groups, Justice Kennedy is putting significant limits on the 
attainability of diversity in the classroom. See Ryan, supra note 13, at 136–39. 
 97. The similarities between the majority and plurality opinions in Parents Involved and the 
majority opinion in Ricci, authored by Justice Kennedy, are discussed infra Subsection I.C.2. See 
also supra note 46 and accompanying text (analyzing his opinion in Grutter). 
 98. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418–20 (2013); see also infra notes 153–58 
and accompanying text. 
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Kennedy apparently supports diversity in theory, but he finds it too 
distasteful in practice.99 He has yet to find a race-conscious program he 
supports.  
B.  A Change in Defining Discrimination 
Parents Involved reconceptualized more than the meaning of 
discrimination and Brown. It also advocated a more rigorous version of 
color-blind jurisprudence than the Rehnquist Court. 
1.  The Rehnquist Court’s Color-Blind Jurisprudence 
Defining race discrimination exclusively by the process of considering 
race, as reflected in the opinions of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy, signals a foundational shift in how discrimination is 
conceptualized. The Rehnquist Court, like the Roberts Court, also found 
whites to be discriminated on the basis of their race.100 In doing so, it 
moved the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause toward a 
more color-blind jurisprudence.101 That is, the Rehnquist Court sought race 
neutrality over race-conscious behavior, and believed awarding benefits on 
the basis of race was just as wrong as withholding benefits on the basis of 
race.102 Yet, its concept of discrimination included a substantive 
component that identified societal and individual harms arising from 
different treatment.103 
For example, the Rehnquist Court often ruled against racial decision 
making because such an approach would foster harmful stereotypes.104 
                                                                                                                     
 99.  See Ryan, supra note 13, at 154–55 (describing Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved as 
“accept[ing] the goal [of diversity] but hold[ing] his nose at the thought of how it might be 
achieved”). 
 100. Perhaps most notable was the creation of a new cause of action, racial gerrymandering, 
which allowed whites to challenge majority–minority voting districts. See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 
509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).  
 101. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict 
scrutiny to all racial classifications). 
 103. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (“But 
under today’s affirmative action doctrine, strict scrutiny has become altogether different. It has 
become a cost-benefit test measuring whether a law that falls (according to the Court itself) squarely 
within the prohibition of the equal protection guarantee is justified by the specially important social 
gains that it will achieve.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[T]he Law School’s 
admissions policy . . . helps to break down racial stereotypes . . . .”); id  at 333 (“To the contrary, 
diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and 
one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”); Bush v. Vera, 517 
U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“But to the extent that race is used as a proxy for political 
characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation.”); id. at 985 (“Our 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and 
excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes.”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 
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(Interestingly, the Rehnquist Court itself engaged in racial stereotyping at 
times.105) It also expressed strong concern with racial preferences 
engendering racial hostility and separatism.106 In that sense, the Rehnquist 
Court’s movement toward color-blind equality recognized the importance 
of other values. It adopted substantive discrimination in its color-blind 
jurisprudence. 
The Parents Involved plurality opinion, however, was entirely divorced 
from the Rehnquist Court’s frequent mention of the specific harms of 
considering race.107 This was true for the Parents Involved opinions by 
                                                                                                                     
(“‘[A] statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those 
who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by 
their race.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980)) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 (stating that racial gerrymandering “reinforces the perception that members 
of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in 
which they live—think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes”); 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (“Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or 
competence.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1991) (“If our society 
is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic 
invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury.”). 
 105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (“Just as growing up in a particular region or having 
particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, 
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately 
still matters.”); id. at 338 (“By virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality, such students 
are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s mission, and less 
likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.”); Easley v. 
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (“[R]ace in this case correlates closely with political 
behavior.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(“Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) (“Racial gerrymandering, even for 
remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further 
from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters . . . .” (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. 
at 657)); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643 (holding that racial gerrymandering “threaten[s] to stigmatize 
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility”); Freeman 
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (“Yet it must be acknowledged that the potential for 
discrimination and racial hostility is still present in our country, and its manifestations may emerge 
in new and subtle forms after the effects of de jure segregation have been eliminated.”); Croson, 
488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic 
harm. . . . [T]hey may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial 
hostility.”). 
 107. The plurality opinion makes a passing mention of the harm of “‘racial blocs,’” “‘racial 
hostility,’” and racial stereotypes. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (plurality opinion) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). It does so, however, in the context of the need for individual 
review. See id. (“[O]ne of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it 
demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own 
merit and essential qualities.” (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). These isolated statements should not be read as evidence that the 
plurality is concerned with something other than individual treatment. The plurality opinion, read in 
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both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Additionally, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Fisher did not discuss any specific 
substantive values attending any equal protection jurisprudence.108  
Further, the Rehnquist Court at times permitted the consideration of 
race, while the Roberts Court in Parents Involved sought to eradicate all 
race-based decision making.109 The Rehnquist Court’s racial 
gerrymandering cases, for example, allowed the consideration of race, so 
long as it was not a predominant factor.110 This was arguably the situation 
presented in Louisville and Seattle. Parental choice was the predominant 
factor, with some consideration of race.111 Parents Involved strongly 
suggested, however, that any consideration of race in the districting process 
would treat voters differently because of their race and hence be unlawful. 
Perhaps even more notable was the Rehnquist Court’s approval of the 
University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in student 
admissions.112 While the Roberts Court has not overruled Grutter’s 
allowance of diversity as a compelling governmental interest, its 
requirement of a more rigorous narrow tailoring analysis in Fisher limits 
the practical reach of Grutter.113 
2.  Justice Thomas 
The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in Parents Involved also 
reflects the difference between the color-blind equality of the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts. Justice Thomas joined in its entirety the opinion by 
Chief Justice Roberts. But his concurring opinion reads more like one of 
the Rehnquist Court than the Roberts Court. Justice Thomas identified the 
harm of considering race in K-12 admissions: “[It] pits the races against 
one another, exacerbates racial tension, and ‘provoke[s] 
                                                                                                                     
its entirety, is clearly only interested in the impact race-conscious decision making has on 
individuals. The importance of individual treatment is what is driving the majority and plurality 
opinions—even though the challenged plans judged no applicant by merit.  
 108. The very brief majority opinion focused on reiterating the commands of Bakke and 
Grutter. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013). Its main point was the 
importance the judiciary undertaking a vigorous narrow tailoring analysis. See id. at 2420–21. In 
discussing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, Justice Kennedy recognized that universities attach 
educational value to a diverse student body. See id. at 2417–18 (mentioning “enhanced classroom 
dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes”). Yet that recognition is quickly 
followed with the need for judicial narrow tailoring, and that analysis includes no mention of any 
substantive values associated with race-conscious activity. See id. at 2420–21.  
 109. See, e.g., supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 110. Strict scrutiny is only triggered in evaluating the constitutionality of majority–minority 
voting districts when race is the predominant factor in line drawing. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 
541, 547 (1999).  
 111. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 112. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).  
 113. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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resentment. . . .’”114 He further attacked diversity on its own terms: “racial 
mixing does not always lead to harmony and understanding,” and “it is far 
from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, 
much less that integration is necessary to black achievement.”115 Likewise, 
his concurring opinion in Fisher faulted affirmative action for setting up 
African-American and Latino students for academic failure.116 Granted, 
Justice Thomas often makes more impassioned and detailed arguments 
than other conservative members of the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts. Yet, 
like the Rehnquist Court, Justice Thomas is concerned with more than the 
process of race-based differential treatment. He faults race-conscious 
activity for its association with other harms.  
C.  Parents Involved and Its Importance 
One could argue that this Article makes too much of one opinion. The 
most controversial aspects of Parents Involved are found, after all, in a 
plurality opinion and not a majority opinion.117  
The conceptual impact of Parents Involved, however, cannot be 
doubted. The Roberts Court authored one of the central civil rights 
opinions of the twenty-first century by rethinking the central civil rights 
opinion of the twentieth century.118 Given Brown’s iconic status in 
American jurisprudence, not just civil rights jurisprudence, any opinion 
that touches upon Brown’s meaning at length (as Parents Involved does) 
deserves significant attention. For that reason alone, Parents Involved, 
even if involving a plurality opinion, deserves careful reading for how it 
defines race discrimination. 
Further, in the majority opinion, the Court defined the injury suffered 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 759 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 115. Id. at 761, 769 n.17; see also id. at 763 (noting the “outstanding educational results” of 
predominately African-American schools); id. at 780 n.29 (affirming historically black colleges); 
see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[B]lack schools 
can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent 
black leadership, success, and achievement.”); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 748 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the success of historically black institutions). 
 116. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432 (2013). (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Although cloaked in good intentions, the University’s racial tinkering harms the very people it 
claims to be helping.”); id. at 2431  (“Setting aside the damage wreaked upon the self-confidence of 
these overmatched students, there is no evidence that they learn more at the University than they 
would have learned at other schools for which they were better prepared. Indeed, they may learn 
less.”). 
 117. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747 (plurality opinion); see supra Subsection I.A.4.  
Moreover, few school districts consider race in student assignment.  See Ryan, supra note 13, at 
144–45.  
 118. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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by the plaintiffs and created a process-only constitutional injury.119 
Similarly, while Justice Kennedy took issue with the plurality’s use of 
Brown, his concurring opinion was entirely consistent with creating a 
process-only constitutional injury.120 In addition, this Article’s reading of 
Parents Involved is consistent with Justice Kennedy’s opinions for the 
Court in Fisher121 and Ricci.122  
1.  Fisher v. University of Texas 
Making the process of considering race a constitutional injury is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s 2013 opinion in Fisher v. University 
of Texas.123 In that opinion, the Court remanded the case to the lower 
courts, which are presently reconsidering the merits of the case. 
Abigail Rose Fisher sued the University of Texas (UT) and other state 
defendants for considering race as a factor in undergraduate admissions.124 
The defendants admit using race as a factor, and argued that their racial 
considerations were entirely consistent with Grutter.125  
Most UT undergraduates are admitted via the facially race-neutral “Top 
Ten Percent Plan,” whereby Texans graduating in the top ten percent of 
their high school class are guaranteed admission to UT.126 Those outside 
the top ten percent (or attending a private school without class rank) are 
eligible for admission through a “full file” review that results in an AI/PAI 
score.127 The AI, or Academic Index score, predicts a student’s expected 
GPA freshman year by analyzing standardized test scores and evaluating 
high school class rank.128 The PAI, or Personal Achievement Index, 
includes race. Specifically, the PAI is composed of three factors: two 
scores from the student’s two personal essays and a student’s personal 
achievement score (PAS).129 The PAS is determined by six factors, one of 
which is “special circumstances.”130 Six factors make up the “special 
circumstances” score, and one of the six factors is race.131 As described by 
the district court, race is “a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor.”132 
The parties dispute the number of students who are admitted and 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
 120. See supra Subsection I.A.5. 
 121. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414–22.  
 122. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 123. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411.   
 124. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 125. Id. at 217–18. 
 126. Id. at 224.  
 127. Id. at 227. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 227–28. 
 130. Id. at 228. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009).  
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enrolled “because of” their race. The plaintiff places the number of 
minority students admitted because of race at a total of thirty-three, out of a 
class of over six thousand.133 The defendants contend the exact number is 
unknowable because race is never a single decisive factor.134 They argue 
that the full file review, however, is significant in increasing the diversity 
at the UT-Austin campus.135 They point out that twenty percent of African-
American admits and fifteen percent of Latino admits are offered 
admission after a full file review.136  
The Top Ten Percent Plan alone produces a great deal of student 
diversity. Before the PAS was changed to take into account race, African-
Americans and Latino students comprised more than twenty percent of the 
entering freshman class at UT Austin.137 While the minority enrollment has 
increased to slightly over twenty-five percent since race became an 
admissions factor, most of the increase is very likely due to demographic 
changes in the state population.138 The defendants argue that additional 
measures are necessary to produce actual classroom diversity, particularly 
in small classes.139 
The plaintiff in this case presently is only seeking the return of 
(nonrefundable) application fees totaling $100.140 She has already 
graduated from Louisiana State University (LSU) and is not seeking any 
damages from attending LSU instead of UT.141 Even more interesting, no 
one is arguing that she would have been admitted if she were African-
American or Latino. Even if she had gotten a perfect score on her PAS, UT 
claims she still would not have been admitted.142 
Fisher’s claim is entirely process oriented—like the plaintiff’s claim in 
Parents Involved. She argues that she suffered a constitutional injury from 
                                                                                                                     
 133. See Brief for Petitioner at 9–10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–
345). 
 134. See Brief for Respondents at 38, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–
345). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 133, at 5 (noting that in 2004 the freshman class was 
21.4% African-American and Hispanic). 
 138. See id. at 11 (reporting that in 2007 the freshman class was 5.8% African-American and 
19.7% Hispanic). 
 139. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 134, at 10 (“[N]early 90% of undergraduate classes 
of the most common size at UT—sections with 10–24 students—enrolled zero or one African-
American student in 2002, and nearly 40% of those classes enrolled zero or one Hispanic student.”). 
 140. See Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action 
Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. 
L. REV. EN BANC 77, 80–81 (2012). 
 141. Id. at 81. 
 142. Brief for Respondents, supra note 134, at 15 (“[P]etitioner would not have been admitted 
to the Fall 2008 freshman class even if she had received a perfect PAI score of 6.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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racial attentiveness in an admissions system.143 Her claim is actually 
weaker than that in Parents Involved because in that case the plaintiffs 
argued that they would have been admitted if they were minority 
students.144 Ms. Fisher, on the other hand, is not making that argument. 
The district court and Fifth Circuit rejected Ms. Fisher’s claim and upheld 
the UT plan as entirely consistent with Grutter.145  
The Supreme Court accepted review of the case.146 Many predicted the 
Roberts Court would revisit (and likely revise) the holding in Grutter given 
the departure of its author, Justice O’Connor.147 After months of 
speculation, the 7–1 opinion instead took a decidedly moderate approach.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy vacated the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion upholding the UT admissions decisions.148 The majority did not 
consider Grutter’s approval of diversity as a compelling governmental 
interest because Ms. Fisher did not specifically challenge it.149 Instead, the 
Court determined that the Fifth Circuit had been too deferential to the 
defendants when holding that the consideration of race was narrowly 
tailored to the quest for diversity. Specifically, the Court counseled that the 
judiciary itself must make a searching inquiry into whether “available, 
workable race-neutral alternatives” would provide the educational benefits 
of diversity.150 A school must use race-neutral means if they work “about 
as well and at tolerable administrative expense.” 151  
Fisher was far from groundbreaking; it relied heavily on precedent and 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 134, at 24. 
 144. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–11, 713–
14, 717 (2007). 
 145. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. 
Supp. 2d 587, 609 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 146. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 132 S. Ct. 1536, 1536 (2012). 
 147. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 45 (2012) 
(“There is no reason for the Supreme Court to have granted certiorari in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin. Unless, of course, the Court plans to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Divided Over Affirmative Action in College Admissions, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/supreme-court-
divided-over-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions/2012/10/10/152ace2a-125e-11e2-be82-c3 
411b7680a9_story.html (“At the end of a lengthy oral argument over admissions policies at the 
University of Texas, it seemed highly unlikely that a majority of the justices would announce a 
ringing endorsement of racial preferences.”); Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factor at 
Universities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/ 
us/a-changed-court-revisits-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions.html (“By the conclusion of 
the argument, it seemed tolerably clear that the four members of the court’s conservative wing were 
ready to act now to revise the Grutter decision.”). 
 148. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013). 
 149. Id. at 2421 (“[T]he parties do not challenge, and the Court therefore does not consider, 
the correctness of [Grutter].”)  
 150. Id. at 2420. 
 151. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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announced no new rules.152 It still, however, represents movement away 
from Grutter.  
Grutter was notable for its deference to educators and its cost-benefit 
analysis153 when it determined that diversity could be a compelling 
governmental interest and approved the law school’s admission policies.154 
Fisher instead required no deference to educators.155 In fact, Fisher is 
similar to Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter where he criticized the 
majority for its lack of rigor in its strict scrutiny analysis.156 In Fisher, he 
was able to undercut those parts of Grutter that counseled deference and 
approved the actual mechanics of a plan.157 Diversity remains, but with the 
proviso that Justice Kennedy made in his Grutter dissent: narrow tailoring 
should mean something—a searching inquiry is necessary.158  
The shift away from deference to educational defendants makes judicial 
acceptance of an affirmative plan far less likely. The UT defendants will 
have a difficult time proving that race is “‘necessary’ . . . to achieve the 
educational benefits of diversity.”159 The Top Ten Percent Plan already 
produces significant diversity, albeit not at numbers reflecting graduating 
Texas seniors.160 Yet the plan likely works “about as well” and is 
“available.”161 Further, the small number of minority students admitted 
through the race-conscious program indicates that the race factor is not 
necessary for diversity,162 particularly given Parents Involved’s reasoning 
that the small numbers affected in that case indicated a lack of need.163 
Grutter’s deference to the university defendants was also inconsistent 
with Parents Involved’s command to eradicate racial attentiveness in 
government decision making.164 By definition, a true color-blind approach 
mandates careful narrow tailoring—it is part of the formula to limiting the 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 2417. 
 153. Parker, supra note 22, at 98–99; supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 154. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 155. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419–21. 
 156. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court, however, does not apply 
strict scrutiny.”); see id. at 388 (“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its 
educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal.”). 
 157. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419–21. 
 158. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 159. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
305 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
 160. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 161. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 163. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734 (2007) 
(“While we do not suggest that greater use of race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the 
districts’ racial classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using racial 
classifications.”). 
 164. See id. at 730. 
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role of race in government decision making.165 Fisher’s command of 
rigorous narrow tailoring, thus, is compelled by the strict color-blind 
approach of Parents Involved. In sum, while Justice Kennedy believes 
strict scrutiny should not be “fatal in fact” nor “feeble in fact,” he is 
certainly making race-conscious decision making more difficult to 
justify—similar to Parents Involved.166 
2.  Ricci v. DeStefano 
This Article’s reading of Parents Involved is also consistent with the 
Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, a case filed under Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.167 Although Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court, decided the case only under Title VII, the 
opinion is instructive on how Justice Kennedy and a majority of Justices of 
the Roberts Court conceptualize antidiscrimination principles.168 The 
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted both Title VII and the Equal 
Protection Clause the same in how they define discrimination.169  
At issue in Ricci was the relationship between two very different causes 
of action found under Title VII: disparate impact and disparate 
treatment.170 Specifically, the case examined when and how employers can 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See id. at 780–82 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 166. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 167. 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009). The two are typically interpreted the same. See Michael Selmi, 
Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 324 
(1997) (demonstrating that “the Court’s approach in the statutory and constitutional areas is, for all 
practical purposes, identical”). 
 168. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
 169. Equal Protection Clause claims are filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the courts have 
long treated Title VII and § 1983 as having identical substantive standards for disparate treatment 
claims. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993); Radentz v. Marion 
Cnty., 640 F.3d 754, 756–57 (7th. Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 
2004). Section 1983 and Title VII’s disparate treatment claims differ primarily in their respective 
procedures and § 1983’s immunity principles. See infra note 252. One remedial difference arose 
after the 1991 Civil Rights Act allowed limited damages in the “same decision” situation. See infra 
notes 268–69 and accompanying text. These differences are not relevant, however, to how the Court 
decided Ricci.  
 170. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580. With disparate treatment,  
[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is 
critical . . . . [A disparate impact claim] involve[s] employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more 
harshly on one group than another . . . . Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not 
required under a disparate-impact theory. 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977). Disparate impact claims are rare and 
unavailable under the Equal Protection Clause. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate 
Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343, 1386 (2010); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact 
Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 702, 728, 746 (2006). 
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address the disparate impact of a selection procedure or test and not be 
guilty of disparate treatment.171 The defendants refused to certify test 
results for promotions within the New Haven Fire Department, in part out 
of a fear of a disparate impact suit given the racially disparate test 
results.172 The plaintiffs in turn sued the defendants for disparate treatment, 
arguing they were treated differently because of their race when the 
defendants refused to certify the test results.173  
The Court held that an employer needed a strong basis in evidence that 
it would be subject to liability for a disparate impact claim to avoid being 
subject to a disparate treatment claim for disregarding test results or 
discontinuing a selection device.174 That evidence was absent in Ricci. The 
city instead had only the racial impact of the test results, which did little to 
prove potential disparate impact liability. 175  Thus, the Supreme Court held 
that the defendants violated Title VII’s disparate treatment prong when 
they refused to certify the test results.176  
Like Parents Involved, racial attentiveness in the decision-making 
process indicated discriminatory intent and a constitutional injury.177 The 
injury arose from the process of considering race. Like the plurality 
decision in Parents Involved, but unlike Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Parents Involved, the majority in Ricci provided no context for 
why the New Haven defendants chose not to certify the racially disparate 
test results.178 Instead, the majority focused on the lack of individual 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580–81. 
 172. Id. at 562, 574. 
 173. Id. at 578–79. 
 174. Id. at 584. 
 175. Id. at 579–80. The dissent disagreed, arguing that the decision not to certify the results 
was not merely because of the racial impact certification would have, but also out of concern with 
the validity of the test. See id. at 608–09, 618 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 593. Notably, the Court awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment on the issue. The 
district court had awarded summary judgment to the defendants. 
 177. See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 
63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 993 (2012) (“The Ricci case held, for the first time, that an employer’s 
attention to disparate impact against some may in fact be evidence of its disparate treatment of 
others.”); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, 
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 107–08 (2010) (arguing that Ricci “imputes an 
illegitimate discriminatory motive into all inquiries regarding racial effects or racial dynamics”); 
Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of 
Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 228 (2010) (“That the Ricci majority worked so hard to 
reach its result suggests that the racial trigger for the tests’ reconsideration doomed that action in its 
eyes, regardless of the legitimacy of the city’s concerns about the tests’ validity.”); id. at 203 
(“[T]he Court for the first time characterized a public employer’s attention to its practices’ racially 
disparate impact as evidence of its discriminatory, and thus unlawful, intent.”); id. at 229 (“The 
Court now, however, appears to treat a decision maker’s attention to the disparities experienced by 
members of traditionally subordinated racial groups . . . as inextricable from an intent to 
discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to demand justification.”). 
 178. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]s the part of the story the 
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treatment because of racial attentiveness to the disparate test results in the 
decision-making process.179  
Granted, Ricci and Parents Involved concerned different types of 
constitutional injuries. The plaintiffs in Parents Involved indicated no harm 
other than the process of considering race and the disappointment of being 
denied enrollment at a preferred school, which previously had no 
constitutional dimension or importance.180 The plaintiffs in Ricci claimed 
the additional harm of not receiving promotions, which has long been 
accepted as a cognizable constitutional injury.181  
Yet Ricci is technically not a promotion case.  The plaintiffs were never 
entitled to a promotion; the test results making them eligible for 
promotions were only valid if certified, and the defendants had refused to 
certify the results. Rather than decide that the plaintiffs lost their promotion 
rights, the majority argued that the plaintiffs prepared for the test in 
reliance on the test being certified.182 The reliance efforts in preparing for 
the test were a sufficient injury.183  
Both Ricci and Parents Involved strongly adopted a color-blind 
approach to discrimination law out of an exclusive concern with individual 
rights. Like Parents Involved, Ricci relied on the impact that racial 
attentiveness had on individual rights,184 without balancing those concerns 
with other values as the Rehnquist Court did in its race discrimination 
jurisprudence.185  
Finally, like Parents Involved, Ricci substantially undercut a 
                                                                                                                     
Court leaves out so plainly shows—the long history of rank discrimination against African-
Americans in the firefighting profession, the multiple flaws in New Haven’s test for promotions—
‘sole reliance’ on statistics certainly is not descriptive of the [city’s] decision.” (citations omitted)); 
Norton, supra note 177, at 218 (“The various opinions in the Supreme Court offer strikingly 
different narratives that provide a particularly powerful illustration of the Court’s continuing divide 
over the extent to which the United States has successfully achieved post-racial status.”); supra note 
82 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579–80. 
 180. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.  
 181. See, e.g., Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing that the plaintiff successfully established a failure to promote a claim cognizable under 
Title VII). 
 182. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583–84 (“Examinations like those administered by the City create 
legitimate expectations on the part of those who took the tests. As is the case with any promotion 
exam, some of the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and personal commitment in 
preparing for the tests.”). 
 183. Id. at 584; Norton, supra note 177, at 247–48 (“The Ricci majority’s heavy weighting of 
the reliance interests impaired by disappointed promotion expectations [indicates that the Court 
may have] expanded its understanding of the costs to nonbeneficiaries that are sufficiently weighty 
to trump the benefits of achieving antisubordination ends.”). 
 184. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578–79, 585, 592–93 (describing the injury entirely in terms of the 
impact on the individual); see also Areheart, supra note 177, at 995 (noting the majority’s focus on 
the individual and the dissent’s focus on the group). 
 185. See supra Subsection I.B.1.  
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foundational decision. The Ricci Court’s treatment of the relationship 
between the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims in Title VII 
seriously called into question the continued viability of the disparate 
impact analysis devised in the 1971 opinion of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
and codified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.186 In sum, like 
Parents Involved, Ricci was a stronger commitment to color-blind 
jurisprudence than previously seen and that commitment arose out of 
exclusive concern with individual rights. It, too, signals a shift.  
Despite its importance, Parents Involved should be restricted to its 
holding: applying the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny to claims of 
race discrimination. Given the different levels of review afforded to sex 
and other discrimination claims, Parents Involved should only be applied 
to instances of race discrimination.187 And although statutory and 
constitutional claims are treated almost identically, the Court should 
confine the Parents Involved decision to the constitutional realm of 
discrimination law.188 That is, a case would require a state or federal actor 
to implicate Parents Involved’s  Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.189  
D.  Parents Involved and White Plaintiffs 
This section considers the implications of Parents Involved’s process-
only constitutional injury, particularly on white plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                                     
 186. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (creating a disparate impact standard for Title VII); see also Ricci, 
557 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (predicting that “the war between disparate impact and 
equal protection will be waged sooner or later”); id. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the majority “shows little attention to Congress’ design or to the Griggs line of cases Congress 
recognized as pathmarking”); Areheart, supra note 177, at 993 (“The Ricci case held, for the first 
time, that an employer’s attention to disparate impact against some may in fact be evidence of its 
disparate treatment of others.”); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 177, at 107 (“Treating the 
City’s racially attentive analysis under disparate impact law as a form of intentional discrimination 
per se not only represented a departure from Title VII law but rewrote antidiscrimination law in an 
unequal way.”); Norton, supra note 177, at 225–26 (“The majority’s premise that Title VII’s 
disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions are potentially antagonistic thus departs 
dramatically from the assumptions of the Griggs Court and Congress that attention to employment 
practices’ racially disparate impact remains entirely consistent with and complementary to Title 
VII’s objective in ensuring equal employment opportunities for all.”). 
 187. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (applying a heightened form of rational 
basis review to discrimination based on sexual orientation); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
555–556 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to discrimination based on sex). 
 188. See supra note 169 and infra note 252 and accompanying text.  
 189. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12, 24–25 (1883) (“[The Fourteenth 
Amendment] does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of 
private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws . . . .”). The 
federal government, of course, is bound by the Equal Protection Clause as well, under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954). 
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1.  The Victims When Discrimination Is Only Process 
Making racial attentiveness in governmental procedures a constitutional 
injury greatly expands the field of potential plaintiffs. Parents Involved 
suggested that all students of all races would have a cause of action against 
the school districts for schools’ consideration of race.190 All students were 
subjected to a racialized student assignment process, and this is the extent 
of the constitutional injury. 
Moreover, Parents Involved strongly implied a cognizable injury exists 
even if students (of any race) were admitted to their preferred school so 
long as the defendants considered race in that process.191 This situation 
obviously would raise questions of jurisdictional standing. The Supreme 
Court in Parents Involved reasoned, however, that a plaintiff would still 
have standing in this situation: “[O]ne form of injury under the Equal 
Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that 
may prejudice the plaintiff . . . .”192 Thus, the possibility of a future injury 
satisfies standing.193 
Making the injury available to all racial groups, however, avoids the 
problem identified by Professors Cheryl I. Harris and Kimberly West-
Faulcon in their analysis of Ricci. Professors Harris and West-Faulcon 
argue that the Ricci Court created an injury available only to whites, who in 
that case were complaining that the fire department did not certify the 
results of a promotion test.194  
Yet instead of “whitening” discrimination, which Professors Harris and 
West-Faulcon observe in Ricci, perhaps the Roberts Court in Parents 
Involved was erasing any racial component from discrimination. In theory, 
that would mean discrimination would have no racial content at all. This is 
an ironic result for an antidiscrimination command adopted in the 
aftermath of the Civil War, but consistent with the Roberts Court’s quest to 
erase race from decision making.195 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007). 
 191. Id. at 718–19. 
 192. Id. (emphasis added). See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1422 (1995) (discussing the issue of standing in the context of discrimination 
actions). 
 193. Some of the plaintiffs in the Seattle case, for example, alleged the possibility of denial of 
a desired school in the future. Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2001), 
aff’d, Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
 194. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562–63 (2009); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 
177, at 102–11. 
 195. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, The 
Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 432 (2009) (characterizing Parents Involved as 
“doctrinally so bizarre that it is difficult to view the decision as having emanated from any genuine 
constitutional principle”). 
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2.  Future White Plaintiffs 
After Fisher, Ricci, and Parents Involved, white plaintiffs will have an 
easier time proving illegal discrimination in their reverse discrimination 
cases. By definition, all race-conscious decision making includes race in its 
process; that makes intent a nonissue. Further, strict scrutiny is not very 
forgiving of any race-conscious activity. What counts as a compelling 
governmental interest has always been quite limited, and Fisher bolstered 
the strength of the narrow tailoring analysis. Racial attentiveness by 
government actors will be relatively easy to attack through the legal 
process. That is certainly the intended result of Fisher, Ricci, and Parents 
Involved. In this sense the opinions accomplished what they intended. 
Do the opinions, however, have unintended consequences for nonwhite 
plaintiffs? The difficulty with applying Parents Involved to traditional 
discrimination claims is determining discriminatory intent, which is the 
topic of the next Part.  
II.  DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED 
This Part turns to the impact of Parents Involved on minority plaintiffs 
claiming race discrimination. Specifically, this Part reveals how Parents 
Involved’s process-only injury makes it slightly easier for these plaintiffs to 
prove discriminatory intent.  
A.  Discriminatory Intent 
All Equal Protection Clause claims require proof of discriminatory 
intent.196 A state worker contesting her firing under the Equal Protection 
Clause, for example, must prove that the defendant’s discriminatory intent 
motivated the termination. 
1.  Defining Discriminatory Intent 
Discriminatory intent means that the defendant took action “because of” 
the plaintiff’s race or other protected status.197 In the context of white 
plaintiffs complaining of race-conscious government action, the connection 
between a defendant’s action and a plaintiff’s race is rarely at issue. The 
defendant usually admits race consciousness, and defends on the ground of 
                                                                                                                     
 196. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 352, 265 (1977). 
 197. ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., THE LAW OF DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 484 
(2011) (“The phrase ‘because of’ is the causal link between an employee’s unfavorable treatment 
and the employer’s impermissible motivation.”); Selmi, supra note 167, at 289 (“[T]he key question 
is whether race made a difference in the decisionmaking process, a question that targets causation, 
rather than subjective mental states.”). But see David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The 
Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1710 (2002) (“In 
discrimination cases, the relationship between the defendant’s action and harm to the plaintiff is 
usually not in controversy. . . . [C]ausation in discrimination cases asks whether the harm to the 
plaintiff was discriminatory in nature.”). 
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compliance with the strict scrutiny standard. For example, the defendants 
in Parents Involved acknowledged that their policies had a racial 
component and defended (unsuccessfully) the policies on the grounds that 
their pursuit of diversity was constitutional.198  
Minority plaintiffs challenging ostensibly race-neutral standards face an 
entirely different situation. A fired state employee, for example, would 
claim she lost her job because of a supervisor’s discriminatory intent, 
despite the state’s racially neutral standards for continued employment. 
Few defendants, if any, would respond by admitting a connection between 
their actions and a plaintiff’s race. Instead they typically respond by 
contending race did not motivate the firing and the plaintiff deserved to be 
fired for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. That response puts 
plaintiffs in the position of proving that the defendants actually did have 
discriminatory intent, despite their protestations to the contrary.  
At its most fundamental level, discriminatory intent means acting with 
“[a] purpose to discriminate”199 and not merely the disparate impact of a 
practice or policy.200 Discriminatory intent is more than an awareness of 
consequences, but instead acting with desire to cause the results.201  
Yet, and with some contradiction, animus or some sort of bad motive is 
unnecessary.202 Discriminatory intent may be subtle203 or unconscious204 
                                                                                                                     
 198. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725  n.12 
(2007). 
 199. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 
403–04 (1945)); see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 (“Proof of racially discriminatory 
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 200. Washington, 426 U.S. at 240–41. While the Equal Protection Clause does not protect 
against disparate effects, Title VII does. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 201. Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose,’ 
however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that 
the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because 
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (citations omitted)). 
 202. This Article uses “motive” differently from Professor Charles Lawrence, who has deemed 
Washington v. Davis wrong in its motive-based inquiry. Lawrence, supra note 90, at 944 (“I wanted 
to demonstrate that Davis’s motive-centered inquiry, its requirement that we identify a perpetrator, a 
bad guy wearing a white sheet and hood, made no sense if equality was our goal.”). The law today 
certainly requires a determinable defendant, a person whose actions can be deemed unlawful. In that 
sense, the law has yet to accept Professor Lawrence’s argument that “the harm resided in the 
continued existence of a widely shared belief in white supremacy and not in the motivation of the 
individual actor or actors charged with discrimination.” Id. at 951. 
 203. As early as 1973, the Supreme Court noted that discrimination was rarely obvious. 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[W]omen still face pervasive, although at 
times more subtle, discrimination . . . .”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 
(1973) (“Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”); see also Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (noting “the problem of subconscious stereotypes 
and prejudices”); Selmi, supra note 167, at 290 (“[S]ince the early 1970s the Court has consistently 
acknowledged the increasingly subtle nature of discrimination and stated that its task is to remain 
vigilant in identifying even the most subtle acts of discrimination.”). 
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and still be actionable.205 Thus, a fired plaintiff can prove that the firing 
was motivated by her race, even if the defendant did not realize it was 
firing her because of race and did not consciously want to discriminate.206 
Discrimination need not be the main or only intention behind the 
challenged action. Instead, the protected status must at least be “a 
motivating factor” for the defendant’s actions.207 Thus, an employee states 
an actionable Equal Protection Clause case (called a “mixed-motive” 
claim) when a legitimate factor such as tardiness motivated the firing, but 
so did the worker’s race. If tardiness were the sole reason, however, the 
firing would not be because of the employee’s race. 
Professor Martin J. Katz criticizes the motivating factor standard as 
requiring too small a causal connection.208 Yet the recognition of a 
motivating factor as sufficient proof is more of a normative decision than a 
causal one. The standard recognizes that discriminatory and 
nondiscriminatory impulses can (and often) coexist, and that the 
discriminatory impulse should still be actionable even if legitimate reasons 
exist as well.209  
                                                                                                                     
 204. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 620 (2009) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that after Title VII was enacted,  “[m]ore subtle—and sometimes unconscious—forms 
of discrimination replaced once undisguised restrictions”); see also Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, 
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 468–70 (2010). 
 205. The current definition of discriminatory intent appears to capture implicit bias, which is 
the attitudes or perceptions toward personal characteristics, such as race, that a person is unwilling 
or unable to reveal. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical 
Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1920–22 
(2009); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 741, 749–50 (2005); Selmi, supra note 167, at 287 (asserting that the Supreme Court’s 
“definition of intentional discrimination is broad enough to encompass most forms of subtle or 
unintentional discrimination”); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1150–
52 (1999).  
 206. How a plaintiff might prove that motivation is the topic of the next Part. See infra 
Subsection II.A.2. 
 207. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) 
(adopting and applying a motivating factor test); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[A]n 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.”). Yet claims of retaliation are not included in the 
statutory definition of when “a motivating factor” is sufficient. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–31 (2013). These claims require “but-for” causation. Id. at 2533. 
 208. But-for causation tells us whether a particular fact is necessary for the plaintiff’s injury. 
See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in 
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 496, 501 (2006). Professor Katz defines a motivating 
factor as less than necessary, but sufficient. See id. at 505–07; see also Hart, supra note 205, at 760 
(“[I]f a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to suggest that race or gender bias contributed to the 
decision, the plaintiff has met her burden, even if the court also believes the ‘truth’ of the 
employer’s proffered reason.”). 
 209. Hart, supra note 205, at 760 (“[E]ven if other factors motivate a decision, when 
prohibited discrimination forms any part of the decision, the law has been violated.”). 
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Further, the law limits the available remedies when the plaintiff proves 
that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor for the action but the 
defendant proves that they would have still made the same decision 
regardless of the plaintiff’s race. For example, the defendant found to have 
fired a worker both because of race and tardiness can defend on the ground 
that the tardiness alone would have resulted in firing. In that situation, no 
remedies are available under the Constitution,210 and Title VII only allows 
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.211  
2.  Proving Discriminatory Intent 
Proving the discriminatory intent of a facially neutral employment 
practice has rarely been simple.212 One reason is access to proof. 
Defendants have unique access to their states of mind—and can easily hide 
that information. Defendants rarely admit, “I am firing you because of 
race.”213 Government actors and employers quickly learned to hide their 
intentions behind race-neutral justifications. In addition, defendants may 
not even be aware of their “true” intentions.214 As a result, plaintiffs 
typically lack direct evidence of discriminatory intent. 
Given the paucity of direct evidence, most plaintiffs rely on 
circumstantial proof.215 The most common practice in employment 
discrimination cases is comparing how similarly situated persons were 
treated.216 For example, were white workers fired for being late, or only the 
tardy African-American employees? The problem with comparators is not 
                                                                                                                     
 210. See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir. 1999); Harris v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 99 
F.3d 1078, 1084 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996); see also infra Subsection III.A.3 (discussing potential limits 
to this remedial rule after Parents Involved). 
 211. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); see also infra Subsection III.A.3 
(criticizing the principle as inconsistent with Parents Involved’s concept of color blindness). 
 212. See, e.g., Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 
1985) (“Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimination is as 
difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that a supervisor 
only assigned African-American women to heavy cleaning because, in the supervisor’s words, 
“colored people are hired to clean because they clean better”). 
 214. See Hart, supra note 205, at 757–58 (“[T]here is no necessary legal difference between 
discrimination that a decisionmaker is truly unaware of, and discriminatory attitudes that the 
decisionmaker simply never expresses out loud.”). 
 215. The Court in Arlington Heights delineated several factors to consider as circumstantial 
evidence of intent to discriminate. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 266 (1977). The factors included the “historical background of the decision,” a “specific 
sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” “[d]epartures from the normal 
procedural sequence,” “[s]ubstantive departures,” and “legislative or administrative history.” Id. at 
267–68; Selmi, supra note 167, at 304 (noting that “the Arlington Heights factors are relevant 
because they provide indicia of discrimination; these factors are relevant because our experience 
suggests they are likely indicative of discriminatory acts”). 
 216. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 (2011).  
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the theory, but the reality. Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg thoroughly 
documents that the workplace seldom has the necessary comparators.217  
In practice, the judiciary is far from willing to conclude that 
circumstantial evidence in fact proves discriminatory intent.218 This is 
consistent with psychological studies documenting people’s hesitance to 
label actions as discriminatory.219 Professor Michael Selmi makes a 
compelling argument that “the Court consistently fails to find 
discrimination unless it is overt; subtle discrimination continues to elude 
the Court’s understanding of intentional discrimination.”220 The lack of 
direct evidence and the treatment of circumstantial evidence leave most 
plaintiffs challenging race-neutral practices unable to prove discriminatory 
intent.221 
B.  Parents Involved and Discriminatory Intent 
Earlier this Article argued that Parents Involved expanded the 
definition of constitutional injury.222 After Parents Involved, racial 
attentiveness in the decision-making process is a constitutional injury 
itself, without proof of any substantive harm. This section explores how 
that change in conceptualizing discrimination affects the meaning of 
discriminatory intent.223  
                                                                                                                     
 217. Id. (“[T]he most traditional and widely used heuristic—comparators, who are similar to 
the complainant in all respects but for the protected characteristic—is barely functional in today’s 
economy and is largely unresponsive to updated understandings of discrimination.”). 
 218. Selmi, supra note 167, at 283–85. Professor Selmi argues that the Supreme Court has 
“repeatedly demonstrated” its unwillingness “to draw inferences of discrimination based on 
circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 285.  
 219. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (“[M]ost people, in most factual circumstances, 
are unwilling to make robust attributions to discrimination.”). 
 220. Selmi, supra note 167, at 334; see also id. (“The Court’s reluctance to draw inferences of 
discrimination is evidenced by the fact that the Court has never invalidated a statute or practice 
based on the factors articulated in its Arlington Heights decision.”). 
 221. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1095 (2009) (“[T]he hurdle of 
proving discriminatory purpose is so daunting that virtually no claim will surmount it.”). For a good 
review of the literature of proposals to redress the difficulty of demonstrating discriminatory intent, 
see Bartlett, supra note 205, at 1898–99. For a good overview of the history and meaning of 
discriminatory intent, see Derek W. Black, Cultural Norms and Race Discrimination Standards: A 
Case Study in How the Two Diverge, 43 CONN. L. REV. 503, 510–18 (2010). 
 222. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
 223. Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 671, 676 (2006) (“In order to make any causal inquiry, the inquiry must be framed. That 
framing requires identifying the act or event that is of interest as a potential cause . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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1.  Expanding the Definition of Discriminatory Intent 
Discriminatory intent requires, of course, attention to what will and will 
not count as discrimination. Parents Involved thus changed not only what 
is meant by discrimination. It also changed discriminatory intent. Courts 
must now also recognize disparate treatment in any processes when 
examining discriminatory intent. In other words, a court must adjust the 
definition of discriminatory intent to capture any racial attentiveness in the 
process of decision making. Only then will courts achieve Parents 
Involved’s goal of eliminating all instances of different treatment based on 
race.224 
Thus, the issue of intent after Parents Involved is not just whether the 
worker was fired because of race, a significant evidentiary hurdle for 
plaintiffs.225 The question now must also capture whether the process of 
firing differed by race. The impact of this expanded definition on defining 
constitutional injury and the attending remedy is discussed below.226  
The definition of discrimination after Parents Invovled does not, 
however, cure the substantial problems of proving a defendant’s 
discriminatory state of mind, even with the opinion’s definition of process-
only discrimination. The absence of direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent and the limitations of the available circumstantial evidence remain.  
2.  Coexistence of Discrimination and Nondiscrimination 
Parents Involved signifies a second shift in discriminatory intent: 
discrimination and nondiscrimination can, and do, coexist.227 In reverse 
discrimination cases, the Court has found discrimination, even if 
nondiscriminatory motivations were present as well.228 In both Ricci and 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 225. The exceedingly low win rates of employment discrimination plaintiffs have been amply 
demonstrated. See generally Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in 
Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 896–920 (2006) (demonstrating by empirical study that 
the chances of the plaintiff winning in employment discrimination litigation is significantly lower 
than in other types of litigation). Plaintiffs lose before both district courts and courts of appeals. See 
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: 
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 105–06 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart 
J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 429, 441 (2004). 
 226. See infra Section III.A (examining how Parents Involved affects racial harassment claims, 
the stray remarks doctrine, and the same decision defense); infra Section III.B (recognizing the 
damage implications of this definition).  
 227. Professor Hart argues persuasively in the Title VII context that the law should not deem 
discrimination as an “either-or” proposition. See Hart, supra note 205, at 743. 
 228. The exception to that, of course, is the University of Michigan School of Law’s denial of 
admission to Barbara Grutter. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. There was strong evidence 
that the law school treated her differently because of her race (white), but the Court, in a 
controversial opinion by Justice O’Connor, put that question aside for other constitutional values. 
See supra Subsection I.A.2. The continued viability of that case is, however, under serious attack 
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Parents Involved, the defendants considered legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
factors in their decision-making process.229 In Ricci, the defendants were 
also concerned about the validity of the promotion test and the need for 
effective leadership.230 In Parents Involved, the defendants valued parental 
choice and school capacity.231 The Court did not allow the 
nondiscriminatory impulses in either case to excuse or invalidate the 
discriminatory impulses.232  
Yet the opposite often occurs in the facially race-neutral context. Here, 
differing versions of why something happened compete with each other at 
the proof stage—one causal set of discriminatory reasons versus another 
causal set of legitimate reasons. This happens because the absence of 
legitimate factors often proves the intent to discriminate.233  
As explained earlier, plaintiffs usually only have access to 
circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent.234 The reason for a 
defendant’s actions and their connection to the plaintiff’s status is rarely 
proved, however, with direct inferences. The law is rarely able to infer 
from circumstantial evidence X, Y, and Z that the defendant discriminated, 
as the law can infer from skid marks the speed of a car’s travels.  
 Rather, a defendant is frequently unable to prove a legitimate reason 
applied in a nondiscriminatory way. When that occurs, the law allows a 
finding of discriminatory intent.235 Thus, discriminatory intent is frequently 
demonstrated by the absence of legitimate reasons for the decision. 
Excluding all legitimate reasons to prove the illegitimate one is obviously a 
difficult evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs. 
Another difficulty for plaintiffs is that the presence of a defendant’s 
legitimate reason is often taken as excusing the presence of an illegitimate 
reason. This is most notable in employment discrimination cases. The 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case,236 used in both Title VII and Equal 
Protection Clause claims, at the outset eliminates two nondiscriminatory 
reasons for an adverse employment action—the plaintiff was unqualified, 
                                                                                                                     
and confinement. See supra Subsection I.C.1.  
 229. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711–12 (2007). 
 230. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592–93; see also supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 231. Id. at 711–12; see also supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.  
 232. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 793. 
 233. See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See Banks & Ford, supra note 221, at 1075 (“[I]ntent is not a thing to be discovered, but 
rather is revealed by an absence—the lack of any other credible reason for the adverse employment 
action leaves intentional discrimination as the only acceptable inference.”). 
 236. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The test includes four 
elements: “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; 
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” Id.  
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or the position was closed.237 This in turn creates a presumption of 
discrimination,238 which the defendant can rebut with evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.239 If the fact finder does not believe 
the defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse employment action, the 
fact finder may, but need not, conclude that the true reason is the plaintiff’s 
protected status.240  
Framing the proof as a legitimate reason or illegitimate reason (proven 
by the absence of legitimate reasons) reduces discrimination to a binary 
question: was a legitimate factor present or not? This happens even in 
mixed-motive cases, where the plaintiff is allowed to prevail by proving 
that race is a motivating factor even though other legitimate reasons were 
also at play.241 If discrimination is proved by the absence of other 
legitimate reasons, then it becomes an either-or question to prove, even in 
mixed-motive cases. A plaintiff still has to prove the illegitimate reason by 
proving the absence of a legitimate reason on that point in the decision 
making.242 Only when the plaintiff has direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent will she be able to avoid this difficulty, and that situation is 
exceedingly rare.243  
However, the question of discrimination cannot be so simply reduced to 
an “either-or” question, as Professor Melissa Hart aptly describes this 
problem.244 If we are to be truly color-blind—meaning that a protected 
status is to have no impact—then the question should not be binary but 
instead more attuned to any racial conduct. That is also true when 
evaluating what counts as an injury after Parents Involved, the topic of the 
next Part. 
III.  INJURY AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED 
This Part turns to the injury element of discrimination claims, to 
examine how Parents Involved affects specific injury issues often faced by 
nonwhite plaintiffs. The federal judiciary has adopted at least three rules 
that excuse race consciousness from legal consequences—the racial 
harassment definition, the stray remarks doctrine, and the same decision 
defense.245 All three are inconsistent with Parents Involved’s command of 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).  
 238. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981). 
 239. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
 240. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
 241. See supra notes 207–12 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Good and Evil in Civil Rights Law: The Case of 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 513, 520 (2011). 
 243. See id.  
 244. See Hart, supra note 205, at 743. 
 245. See infra Subsections III.A.1–3. 
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absolute color blindness.246  This Part also recognizes, however, that these 
injuries will likely result in more limited remedies.247 
A.  A Truly Color-Blind Concept of Injury 
At times, plaintiffs produce evidence of explicitly racial conduct, and 
the law excuses it. After Parents Involved, however, that must change. 
Chief Justice Robert’s concept of color blindness—his command that “the 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race”—compels a prohibition of all racial actions.248 The 
Court’s concept of discriminatory injury must therefore now recognize the 
illegality of all racial actions.  
1.  Racial Harassment 
Racial harassment claims often arise in the workplace, and such cases 
are typically decided under Title VII’s prohibition against different 
treatment.249 If the claim involves state action, the plaintiff may also file 
suit under § 1983 for the Equal Protection Clause claim.250 Apart from the 
state action requirement for § 1983, the substantive standards are the 
                                                                                                                     
 246. See infra Section III.A. 
 247. See infra Section III.B. 
 248. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). For a look at the continued prevalence of racial 
harassment cases, see Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 98–100 fig.4 (2006). Racial harassment cases in the workplace are 
also filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. Id. at 80 tbl.11, 93 tbl.17, 108 (providing statistical 
evidence of the continued relevance of §§ 1981 and 1983 claims). 
 250. For examples of cases in which public employees produced evidence of racial comments 
and other harassing conduct by their public employers but failed to establish that the conduct was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to make a successful claim, see Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 
1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that allegedly racist comments by supervisors were too 
sporadic to be considered pervasive); Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that coworker comments had only a tenuous connection to the plaintiff’s race 
and national origin and were not sufficiently severe to establish a Title VII claim); Caver v. City of 
Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining that allegedly racist supervisor comments 
were not sufficiently severe or pervasive because they were not made directly to plaintiff, but rather 
heard secondhand); Smith v. Northeastern Illinois University, 388 F.3d 559, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that her work environment was objectively hostile 
within the meaning of Title VII because supervisor remarks, while clearly racist, were not directed 
at her); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 643–44 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
two allegedly racist supervisor comments, made more than six months apart, were not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to establish a Title VII claim); and Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268–70 
(5th Cir. 2002) (finding that supervisor and coworker comments were too vague to establish an 
objectively hostile work environment). Professors Pat Chew and Robert Kelley found that plaintiffs 
win less than half of their cases. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 249, at 87 (finding a 33.3% 
success rate “when defendants use ostensibly race-linked physical objects (such as nooses or Ku 
Klux Klan-associated attire)” and a 25.9% success rate with “race-obvious verbal harassment (such 
as the use of [n- - - - -]).”). 
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same.251 The racial harassment must be unwelcome and either pervasive or 
offensive (both of which are judged by an objective and a subjective 
viewpoint).252 It can include both obviously racist treatment and more 
subtle racist treatment.253  
The current racial harassment standard thus excuses employers from 
any responsibility for racial slurs and racist objects in the workplace if they 
are welcomed or not severe or pervasive from either an objective or 
subjective viewpoint. That approach permits racial attentiveness to 
continue—racial slurs and racist objects are often “allowed” because they 
do not rise to the level of actionable racial harassment.  
Parents Involved suggests a different analysis when state actors are 
sued for racial harassment involving blatantly racist activity by either 
supervisors or coworkers. Then the line of inquiry would not be welcome-
ness, pervasiveness, or offensiveness, but instead whether plaintiff at any 
point was treated differently as an individual because of race.254 Under 
Parents Involved, the degree of pervasiveness and offensiveness is a 
question of damages and not a question of liability.  
Racial slurs and racist objects, even if not pervasive or offensive, would 
entail the different individual treatment prohibited by Parents Involved. 
That is, would the defendant have called the plaintiff a racist term if the 
plaintiff had been of a different race? Different individual treatment would 
                                                                                                                     
 251. See, e.g., Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004); Busby v. City 
of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776–77, 782 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 252. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (sexual harassment case); EEOC 
v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 668 (4th Cir. 2011) (racial harassment case); Patterson, 375 F.3d at 
227 (racial harassment claim). While Equal Protection Clause claims do not include the disparate 
impact challenges available under Title VII, racial harassment addresses disparate treatment. 
Disparate treatment claims under Title VII share the same substantive standards as Equal Protection 
Clause claims. See id. at 225; supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
Title VII and Equal Protection Clause claims do differ in their procedural requirements and 
potential defendants. Title VII claims must be first filed with Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission or an appropriate state agency. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 220. Title VII suits are filed 
against employers, not individuals. Id. at 226. Section 1983 suits, on the other hand, can be filed 
against both employers and individuals (sued in their personal capacity) who are state actors. Id. 
Individuals sued under § 1983 are also entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 227, 231, 243–44 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982). Yet when 
the employer is a municipality, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a policy or custom of 
allowing the challenged action to state a § 1983 claim. Patterson, 375 F.3d at 226.  
The suits also differ in terms of the doctrine of respondeat superior. None exist for § 1983 
claims. Id. Under Title VII, an employer can assert an affirmative defense that the employer 
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and [] 
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). That defense is not applicable in cases involving a tangible 
employment action. See id. at 760–61. 
 253. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 249, at 72–75. 
 254. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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very likely occur if the racial slurs or racist objects were directed toward 
someone of the race or affiliated with the race the slur or object seeks to 
demean.255 For example, a white man would very unlikely be targeted with 
the term “Boy” to demean his race, while the opposite would likely be true 
for an African-American man.256 The same applies with racially charged 
objects such as nooses. Racial slurs and objects involving a perpetrator and 
victim of the same race would count as well.  
This application of Parents Involved to racial harassment claims is 
contrary to the idea that employment discrimination law should not 
establish a “civility code” in the workplace.257 Yet that is the consequence 
of Parents Involved when it sought to scrub racial attentiveness completely 
from government decision making. By equating the actions of the Seattle 
and Louisville school districts with de jure segregation, it created a 
standard that all state actors should always treat all persons without regard 
to race.258 Chief Justice Roberts established a strict version of color-blind 
treatment and thereby compelled that a workplace be completely free from 
treating individuals differently because of their race. No racial statements 
or objects would ever be allowed; if they were, different treatment based 
on race would be permitted.  
Note, however, that the question of employer liability for the racial 
harassment actions by employees remains after Parents Involved.259 
Employers can still defend on the grounds that they took reasonable 
remedial steps in response to harassment the employer knew or should 
have known about.260 That is an issue of vicarious liability—not injury, 
                                                                                                                     
 255. For example, calling a white woman romantically involved with an African-American 
person a “n- - - - - lover,” would be treating that white woman differently because of her race. Using 
the “n-word” toward any person of color would very likely be because of race as well.  
 256. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (“Although it is true 
[that the word “boy”] will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, 
standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including 
context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“[S]tandards for 
judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general 
civility code.’”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–82 (1998) (explaining 
that Title VII “forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the 
victim's employment”). 
 258. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.  
 259. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (providing an affirmative 
defense to negate vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors that does not result in a tangible 
employment action); May v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 716 F.3d 963, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2013) (examining 
the reasonableness of the employer’s response to coworker harassment). 
 260. For a discussion of the contradiction between the reporting requirement and actual 
employment practices, see Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive 
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 373–80 (2004). For a statistical analysis of the affirmative 
defense and a critical examination of its effects, see generally David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev 
J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An 
Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual 
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which is the topic of Parents Involved. 
2.  Stray Remarks Doctrine 
 Closely related to the definition of racial harassment is the stray 
remarks doctrine. Under this principle, the judiciary has excused explicitly 
racial comments as too insignificant to indicate discrimination motivated 
by an adverse employment action.261 For example, a Puerto Rican doctor 
had her jury verdict set aside, in part, because her supervisor’s facially 
discriminatory statement was too remote to indicate a discriminatory intent 
in not renewing her contract.262  
While the statement may be inadequate proof of discriminatory intent in 
the decision not to renew a contract, the statement still indicated different 
individual treatment because of ethnicity. The supervisor was quoted as 
saying that “Dominican doctors were better than the other physicians who 
were . . . Puerto Rican.”263 That statement treated the Puerto Rican plaintiff 
differently as an individual because of her ethnicity—it classified her as an 
inferior doctor because she was Puerto Rican instead of Dominican. Yet 
the stray remarks doctrine allowed supervisor to make the statement 
without any legal consequences.  
Excusing these explicitly racial comments is inconsistent with Parents 
Involved for the same reasons racial harassment exists even when not 
pervasive or severe, as discussed in the previous section.264 Explicitly 
racial comments treat people differently because of their race, contrary to 
the command of Parents Involved that individuals always deserve race-
neutral treatment. 
3.  Same Decision Defense 
Parents Involved also restricts the impact of the same decision 
defense.265 The principle applies in employment discrimination cases when 
the defendant proves that the plaintiff would have suffered the same injury 
                                                                                                                     
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265 (2001). 
 261. Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 158–60 (2012). Professor Kerri Lynn Stone 
documents the increased frequency of the principle and creates a useful way to classify its use. Id. at 
151. 
 262. Alvarado-Santos v. Dep’t of Health, 619 F.3d 126, 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2010). The court 
explained: “In addition, [the plaintiff] offered no evidence that [the decision maker’s] isolated 
remark about Dominican doctors was close in time to the decision not to renew her employment 
contract, was related to her, or was otherwise related to the employment decision.” Id. at 133 
(footnote omitted). This case and others are collected in Stone, supra note 261, at 149–50, 159–68. 
 263. Alvarado-Santos, 619 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 264. See supra Subsection III.A.1. 
 265. For citations to earlier scholarship criticizing this rule, see Katz, supra note 208, at 517 
n.109. 
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in the absence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent. 266 For example, a 
defendant found to have fired an employee because of race can defend on 
the ground that the defendant would have fired the employee for tardiness 
anyway. In this case, the employee would have suffered the same adverse 
employment action regardless of the impermissible discriminatory intent.  
The same decision defense precludes the award of any compensatory 
damages.267 A plaintiff can still recover injunctive relief and attorney’s fees 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for a Title VII violation.268 No remedy 
is available for constitutional claims filed under § 1983, however, because 
the Court has declared that the defense indicates the absence of a 
constitutional injury.269 Thus, the doctrine completely absolves the 
defendant from any constitutional consequences of discriminatory intent.270  
The defense, however, is at odds with the core principle of Parents 
Involved—prohibiting any individual from being treated differently on 
account of race. It allows racial processes to continue in the workforce, so 
long as the employee still deserved the adverse employment action. Yet the 
person fired for her race (but also legitimately fired for tardiness) has still 
suffered a different process in firing. Parents Involved prohibited all 
racially discriminatory conduct, not just ones that result in substantive 
harm.  
Moreover, the fired worker who learns of the discriminatory intent will 
possibly suffer psychological damages. Even more fundamentally, the 
complete denial of constitutional damages allows discrimination to exist 
without constitutional consequences. It encourages employers not to take 
responsibility for their discrimination, but instead to find another reason to 
                                                                                                                     
 266. The defense applies to both Title VII and Equal Protection Clause claims. Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95, 101 (2003) (explaining that both the same decision defense and a 
limit on compensatory damages apply when evidence of discriminatory intent is direct or 
circumstantial); Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1999) (“[E]ven if the government has 
considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can 
nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the 
forbidden consideration.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).  
 267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (providing the court shall not award damages when a 
respondent demonstrates that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor).  
 268. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(2)(B)(i) (providing that the court may grant declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs when a respondent demonstrates that the same action 
would have been taken in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor). 
 269. See Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20–21. 
 270. As Professor Martin Katz has previously argued, full compensatory damage recovery in 
this instance would be a windfall to the plaintiff. See Katz, supra note 208, at 512 (“[T]he plaintiff 
is placed in a better position than she would have been in absent the defendant’s actions.”). 
Professor Katz would allow, however, “punitive/deterrent sanctions” to create adequate punishment 
and deterrence. Id. at 515, 539. He would also allow attorney’s fees and perhaps a “bounty” amount 
to plaintiffs to “provide better incentives for plaintiffs in minimal causation cases to act as private 
attorneys general.” Id. at 540.  
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fire the worker. This separate injury of a different process deserves a 
remedy, as explored in the next section. 
B.  Limitation on Remedies 
Arguing that Parents Involved expanded the constitutional definition of 
discrimination leaves unanswered the question of the attending remedy. In 
many cases, immunity issues may preclude any compensatory damage.271 
Even when available, however, the injury of racial attentiveness by itself 
may be worth little in terms of compensatory damages.  
The fundamental rule of compensatory damages is that the scope of the 
injury determines the scope of the remedy and that remedies should be 
designed to place the plaintiff in the position she would have been in but 
for the violation.272 Compensatory damages are rarely presumed. Instead, 
courts will require proof of the specific injuries suffered.273  
Injuries arising from different treatment can include more than 
economic damages arising from a lost job. Stigma and dignitary harms 
often attend racial treatment.274 Plaintiffs should be permitted to prove the 
emotional harms common to discrimination, and defendants should be 
financially responsible for those injuries. If no injury other than the process 
of different treatment is proven, however, the plaintiff would only be 
entitled to nominal damages.275  
Other types of relief can and should be awarded. A court may issue an 
injunction prohibiting the conduct in the future.276 Prevailing plaintiffs can 
receive reasonable attorney’s fees.277 Punitive damages against individual 
defendants are available as well.278  
Lastly, in these times of denying race consciousness, the power of a 
judicial declaration of the existence of discrimination carries significant 
                                                                                                                     
 271. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208–09 (4th ed. 2011); see also Cheryl 
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meaning.279 The Supreme Court has proved willing and able to declare 
whites the victims of discrimination, in the name of color-blind justice.  
Judicial recognition that minorities still suffer from different treatment as 
well presents a more accurate picture of the presence of race-conscious 
activity.  
CONCLUSION 
The Roberts Court’s commitment to color-blind jurisprudence is 
stronger than any previous Court’s, including the Rehnquist Court. It has 
defined white plaintiffs as victims of race discrimination when the process 
of decision making treated them differently because of their race, apart 
from any other attending substantive injury. That expanded definition of 
injury should have important consequences for minority plaintiffs as well. 
While it eases a bit the high burden nonwhite plaintiffs have of proving 
discriminatory intent, Parents Involved should provide additional 
constitutional protections in proving injury.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 279. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086–87 (1984) (“But when one 
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